The search neutrality debate questions the ranking methods of search engines. We analyze the issue when content providers offer content for free, but get revenues from advertising. We investigate the noncooperative game among competing content providers under different ranking policies. When the search engine is not involved with high-quality content providers, it should adopt neutral ranking, also maximizing user quality-of-experience. If the search engine controls high-quality content, favoring its ranking and adding advertisement yield a larger revenue. Though user perceived quality may not be impaired, the advertising revenues of the other content providers drastically decrease.
INTRODUCTION
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Search engines' business model is based on advertising [Levene 2011] , with both organic and sponsored links. Slots are assigned to sponsored links through auctions [Maillé et al. 2012] and to organic ones through a proprietary ranking mechanism based on the relevance of the linked Web page for the user's query. However, when ranking organic links, the search engine may use metrics related to its own interest, inducing an unfair result for some links by ranking them below where they should be and making them rarely reached by users.
Ranking criteria are crucial for the business model of all the stakeholders: search engines, content providers, and advertisers. Content providers wish to improve their ranking among organic links, such as through search engine optimization techniques, without affecting the quality of the displayed content [Berman and Katona 2013] . Quality is a main driver for users' choices in the competition between organic and sponsored links [White 2013 ], but also among sponsored links [Chen and He 2011; Athey and Ellison 2011] , though influenced by the ranking strategy of the search engine. Search engines may use this influence to their own advantage, distorting both users' choices and the market structure. Acting as intermediaries between buyers and sellers, they can divert their users from their preferred Web sites to those in which the search engine has a vested interest [Hagiu and Jullien 2011] ; this is a nonneutral behavior that raises the issue of search neutrality.
A parallel can be made with the issue of net neutrality [D'Acquisto et al. 2012] , where network providers may unduly discriminate among the service/content providers that use their network. Search neutrality is considered as the next frontier even if net neutrality should prevail [Odlyzko 2009 ]. Critics of the search neutrality approach have cast doubts about the capability of measures to lead to neutral search results and effectively protect users against the abuse perpetrated by Web sites [Grimmelmann 2010] . They have even promoted search bias as the product of the competitive process, as well as the presence of vertical integration (the search engine favoring its own content) as a generally efficient and procompetitive practice [Manne and Wright 2011] . But the search engine's ranking strategy may adversely affect the market position of content providers, thus the debate on search neutrality should consider the impact of a nonneutral behavior on the content providers' revenues.
In this article, we define a model to analyze the influence of search neutrality on the distribution of free content (funded by advertising revenues). A neutral search engine should rank the results of a search based on the relevance of contents to users, namely their quality-of-experience (QoE), that is negatively affected by advertising. On the other hand, a nonneutral SE would display results based on the potential revenue from CPs (such a model encompasses both cases wherein the search engine favors its own content and where it receives payment from CPs to favor theirs). Our objective is to investigate the consequences (as to user QoE, content provider, and search engine revenue) of the presence of a regulation imposing search neutrality. We focus on the competition among content providers, although we consider the presence of competition among search engines through the possibility for users to reduce their queries on a search engine (hence leaving for competing search engines). For this purpose, we define a noncooperative game among those content providers that use their level of advertising as a strategic leverage to maximize their revenues. Their behavior is strongly influenced by the ranking rules applied by the search engine. The application of rules favoring some CPs at the expense of others may strongly distort the market, especially with a monopolistic search engine. The onset of this situation should call for regulatory intervention. Here we provide grounds for such a decision, examining the case wherein the SE decides its own ranking criterion. We consider both the case of a monopolistic search engine (the rate of requests to the SE being assumed independent of the QoE) and that wherein this rate depends on the quality of the content providers to which it sends users. The ranking policies we examine are based on either quality alone (the neutral approach) or the revenues the content provider transfers to the search engine, possibly weighted through the qualityof-experience perceived by the user, therefore representing two different nonneutral approaches. We also consider the case of vertical integration between the search engine and one of the content providers that may then be favored by its parent company. This case has become particularly interesting: the acquisition of YouTube by Google is a major example of vertical integration, with a search engine owning a video content provider.
To the best of our knowledge, this article is one of the very first to try to model mathematically the impact of a nonneutral search engine behavior on Internet actors and to analyze it thanks to game theory. The other noticeable reference is Coucheney et al. [2012] , but it does not focus on the impact of advertisement as we are doing here.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the mathematical models for the QoE resulting from content with advertising, the influence of ranking on the visit rate of content providers, and the strategies of content providers. In Section 3, we analyze the case wherein content providers neglect their individual influence on the success of the search engine (the number of requests per time unit) through a noncooperative game. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, whatever the ranking policy. Under a neutral policy, we find that content providers with the same intrinsic quality (that in the absence of advertising) are led to reduce their advertising level as the number of competitors grows. Content providers with higher intrinsic quality are instead led to advertise more, getting larger revenues. If the search engine adopts a revenue-based ranking policy, we prove that content providers are led to set their advertising level to the maximum possible value, zeroing the quality perceived by users regardless of their relationship to the search engine. If the revenue-based policy is mitigated by considering the QoE as well, vertically integrated content providers are favored, yielding more advertising and larger revenues. Section 4 treats the case of content providers including their effect on the request arrival rate in their strategic decision, while comparing the performance of neutral and nonneutral rankings. In this case, we prove that the Nash equilibrium can be found as the solution of a system of polynomial equations. Under the neutral policy, content providers with the same intrinsic quality set their advertising level so as to halve their QoE. Under a nonneutral policy, however, content providers are instead led to increase their advertising as the number of competitors grows, though their revenues decline until lower than in the neutral case. The conclusions are given in Section 5.
MODELS FOR THE BEHAVIOR OF THE STAKEHOLDERS
We consider a single search engine that has to rank different Web pages hosting content when a user performs a search. We focus on a single search engine, but account for the possibility that the user selects an alternative search engine, abandoning the strictly monopolistic market structure for SEs. Contents are controlled by different CPs that can play with the amount of advertisement on their Web page. In this article, we consider a piece of information that is searched for by a user and proposed by a set I of CPs. In this section, we provide models for the behavior of all the stakeholders: users, the search engine, and content providers. A general discussion on modeling issues and interactions between stakeholders in the field of network economics can be found in Maillé and Tuffin [2014] . 
User's Quality-of-Experience with Content Providers
The content delivered in response to a query may be, for example, a video sequence, a movie, a TV show, or a document. The quality of the content delivered by CP i is Q i and captures both the case wherein the same content is delivered by different CPs and the case wherein the contents offered in response to a query by different CPs are different. Different contents naturally have a different quality. Even if the content is the same, the quality of CPs may be influenced by several factors: the graphical design of the user interface, the format of the content (e.g., a document delivered as either a pdf or a Word file), the number of clicks needed to reach the content, the information to provide to get the content (e.g., a registration phase), and the time elapsed before accessing the content.
Whatever the quality of the content delivered, the user experience is also affected by the advertising included by the CP, such as a sequence of a few seconds before a video can be watched. Advertisements are perceived as a nuisance by users, lowering their quality of experience, and have therefore a twofold effect: positive on the content providers' advertising revenues, but negative on the QoE perceived by users. The total amount A i of advertising introduced by CP i can be interpreted in two ways, depending on the point of view.
-For the CP. A i is proportional to the advertising revenue that the CP gets each time a user clicks on the link. -For users. A i corresponds to a nuisance, and advertisement is supposed to yield a loss of QoE proportional to A i .
Through some inessential changes of unit, we consider that CP i earns A i each time its content is accessed and that the quality-of-experience V i for the user with CP i ∈ I is
where Q i > 0 is the intrinsic quality of the content of CP i (that experienced by the user if there were no advertisement). We assume that V i is an intrinsic characteristic of the content and advertisement bundle, depending neither on the decisions taken by the search engine (e.g., its ranking criterion) nor on the user's tastes. We also consider the relative amount a i := A i /Q i of advertisement introduced by CP i; since we limit the advertising level to values giving a nonnegative QoE, we have
User's Choice of a Search Engine
We focus only on one SE in this article, but the user may not choose this SE, for instance, if the quality of the results provided by the SE is bad. We summarize this effect through the average request arrival rate β (for the considered content) that the SE receives per time unit. We assume this depends on the expected QoE of the user with that SE. We use β as a proxy for the probability that the user chooses this SE among all the possible choices.
SE Ranking Policies and Click-Through Rates
While the user's QoE is determined by both the Web page's intrinsic quality and the amount of advertisement, the ranking criterion influences the behavior of users and may reduce the visibility of CPs with good QoE. In general, most users click on one of the links in the highest-ranked slots. Here we assume that the link clicked after a search depends only on the ranking chosen by the SE based on the scores s = (s i ) i∈I attributed by the SE to each CP. The SE can adopt one of several score functions, depending on its aim. In this section, we examine the most relevant, falling into the two classes of neutral and nonneutral behavior.
Rather than separately addressing ranking and the subsequent user clicking behavior, here we aggregate them by considering that the SE allocates the slots (possibly introducing randomness) based on the scores s, so that the proportion of clicks on CP i is
The average total number of clicks per search may be different from 1 (some users may not click any link while others may try several), however, we can consider it equal to 1 without loss of generality, since it can be included in the value of β (to be interpreted as the number of links visited via the SE per time unit), while C i is the probability (conditional on a link being clicked) that CP i is accessed and describes the overall behavior of the user.
2.3.1. Neutral Ranking Behavior. Search neutrality should correspond to a situation wherein QoE is the only thing that matters when ranking, without any consideration for profit. The resulting score, equalling the QoE, and the proportion C i of clicks on CP i from Eq. (1) are
2.3.2. Nonneutral Ranking Strategies. We say the SE is nonneutral when the scores are not the QoE values (V i ) i∈I . In particular, we investigate the case when the ranking criterion considers that the SE gets a share b i of the advertising revenue of each CP i ∈ I. Both parties (the search engine and the content provider) know where the traffic comes from: the SE knows how many times a specific ad was clicked, while the CP knows the referral traffic, namely which search engine the traffic came from (through the HTTP referer field of the HTTP header). This is an incentive for the SE to favor CPs with a large b i and large advertising levels. In particular, we consider two possible nonneutral ranking strategies.
-Revenue-based ranking is where the SE ranks CPs on the basis of the revenue it can collect from them rather than the quality experienced by the users. The ranking adopted by the SE impacts the click-through rate and therefore on the revenues of CPs. If the search engine receives money by content providers, it has a real interest in favoring those that may generate more revenues. The ranking scores and resulting click-through rate are
-Weighted-QoE ranking is where the SE modifies the neutral ranking rule, introducing a bias to favor the CPs that provide larger revenues. The bias is modeled through the corrective factor b i in the neutral rule (2), which may be interpreted as the share of the CP controlled by the SE. In the search neutrality debate, search engines may be accused of favoring the contents they (partially) own. The scores and the click-through rate are
Content Providers: Revenues and Strategies
The expected revenues (per time unit) of a content provider i ∈ I are denoted by R i . Since we are considering free content in this work, CPs' revenues only come from advertising and are proportional to the amount of advertisement added to their content, but also to the number of clicks they receive per time unit, depending on the SE ranking through (1). After deducting the fee paid to the SE, the average revenues per time unit of any CP are
(5) The revenue of a CP i depends on its strategic choice a i as well as on the amount of advertising (a j ) j∈I =i set by the other CPs through the proportion of clicks C i to the CP defined in (3). We assume that CPs are able to evaluate the strategies of their opponents by visiting their pages, measuring the advertising level, and adapting their strategies. Here we model these interactions among CPs as a noncooperative game [Osborne and Rubinstein 1994] , where each CP chooses its advertising load a i to maximize its revenues. We distinguish two subcases wherein content providers act as either price takers or price setters.
2.4.1. Price-Taking Content Providers. The search engine market is currently dominated by Google: the statistics for the period October 2011 through March 2012 give Google a share of 80.39% (see http://www.statowl.com/search engine market share.php), with a normalized Hirschmann-Herfindahl index of 0.66 indicating strong dominance. In the short term, we can expect this quasi-monopoly situation would remain even if the quality of the results displayed were affected by a change in the ranking policy (from neutral to nonneutral). In our model, this can be interpreted as the rate β of requests not affected by the quality of the results (in fact, under a monopoly one has no choice but submit one's requests to the only search engine, whatever its quality). Actually, this rate may still vary with the average QoE, but CPs do not consider this effect when deciding their advertising policy. That bias can, for instance, stem from a large number of CPs (hence the individual effect of each CP on β is small and neglected). In this sense, CPs are price takers: they do not consider the effect of their own actions on the global price (here, the search rate β).
Price-Setting Content
Providers. In this model, content providers do anticipate the effect of advertising strategies on the global success of the SE as embodied by β = β(a), where a = (a i ) i∈I is the advertising profile of the CPs. Each CP i then chooses its advertising level a i soas to maximize
where a −i is the profile of the advertising strategies of all CPs but i, namely a = (a i , a −i ). In such a case, CPs are said to be price setters since they are aware of their contribution to the search rate β that may decrease as the amount of advertisement increases. Acting as price setters corresponds to making strategic moves with an eye on the long term.
EQUILIBRIUM ADVERTISING STRATEGIES OF PRICE-TAKING CONTENT PROVIDERS
In this section, we investigate the case when CPs are price takers, that is, they treat the total request rate β as a constant when determining their advertising strategy. We study the response of CPs to the ranking strategy of SEs as a noncooperative game. Content providers act as the players using the level of advertising as their strategic leverage to maximize their revenues. The game is solved by searching for a Nash equilibrium after identifying the best-response function of each player. For each ranking policy, we will provide results for the general case before treating two specific situations:
-the symmetric case where all CPs are identical; and -the duopoly case where only two CPs compete.
Since the multiplicative factor (1−b i ) is constant and β is considered as constant by CPs in this section, the quantity that the i-th content provider intends to maximize, under neutral ranking with the scoring function defined in (2), is the utility proportional to
We can establish here the existence of a (nontrivial) Nash equilibrium for the noncooperative game played among CPs. 
PROOF. When all the other CPs set their advertising quantities, the i-th content provider seeks the quantity a i maximizing U i , that is, its best response to the others' strategic choices.
The case when all competitors of CP i set their advertising level to the maximum value a j = 1 is degenerate. In this case, C i = 1 when a i < 1, and U i = a i Q i is strictly increasing in a i . But C i is not defined for a i = 1, hence no exact best response exists. However, this case is not a problem, since the strategy a i = 1 is dominated for each CP i and strictly dominated when at least one opponent j sets a j < 1. This is therefore an unlikely situation.
We now consider the case when at least one CP j = i sets a j < 1. In such a case, U i is a continuous function of a i , as can be easily seen in (7).
We remark that U i = 0 when a i = 0 and when a i = 1, and that
has the same sign
, that is strictly negative. As a result, U i is a strictly concave function of a i on the interval [0, 1] and has a unique maximum that is in (0, 1). Therefore, the best response of CP i is the only solution in (0, 1) of the equation
that brings a quadratic equation in the advertising quantity
The larger solution of the quadratic equation is to be discarded, since it would give a i > 1. The smaller one is then in (0, 1) and gives us the best response function for CP i:
with
For convenience we define f (x) :
Differentiating f , we get for
therefore f is strictly decreasing on R + and thus
Now let us consider a small ∈ (0, 1) and consider any strategy vector a in the
, where Q min := min j∈I Q j and Q max := max j∈I Q j . From (11), the best response of each CP i to this strategy vector equals
Note from (13) that the derivative of f is continuous on (0, +∞) and tends to −∞ at 0, therefore we can find small enough so that f ((n − 1)
) ≤ f (0) − , using the continuity of f . Since f (0) = 1, we obtain that the best-response correspondence
|I| is a compact convex subset of R |I| , from Brouwer's fixed-point theorem, it has a fixed-point that constitutes a Nash equilibrium with strategies a i ∈ [0, 1).
The lower bound in equilibrium comes from the lower bound of Eq. (14).
Although not solvable analytically, the collection of best-response functions (11) builds a system of nonlinear equations in the a i 's, to be solved numerically.
3.1.1. Symmetric Case. We can consider the symmetric case where all CPs have the same intrinsic quality, so that Q i = Q in Eq. (10) and the utility for the i-th provider becomes
, allowing for the game to be fully solved.
PROPOSITION 3.2. When the search engine adopts a neutral ranking, the noncooperative game played by CPs setting their advertising level has the unique Nash equilibrium
PROOF. The revenue optimization procedure leads to the equation
This implies that, for any i, k ∈ I, we have
But from Proposition 3.1, we know that at a Nash equilibrium a j > 1/2 for all j ∈ I, hence the right factor is strictly positive and a i = a k : Nash equilibria are necessarily symmetric, of the form a i = a for all i ∈ I. Plugging this condition into (16), we obtain a unique equilibrium wherein the optimal advertising quantity a for any provider is as given in (15).
The Nash equilibrium advertising level of (15) is a decreasing function of the number of content providers: each content provider is led to stuff less advertisements as the competition level (number of content providers) grows. In the limit, when the number of competitors becomes very large, we have the optimal advertising quantity that cuts by half the QoE with respect to the upper bound represented by intrinsic quality
In the symmetric case, the utility for each content provider is
while the cumulated utility of the bunch of content providers (recall that the revenue of each provider is its utility multiplied by
Since utilities are proportional to revenues as in Eq. (7) and can be taken as a proxy for them, the preceding expression shows that the aggregated revenue shrinks as the number of players grows: the overall utility reduces by 1/3 when there are just two providers, but by 1/2 when the number of players gets very large.
3.1.2. Duopoly Case. Another special case of interest is duopoly, wherein just two content providers (with different quality) are present. In fact, the presence of high fixed costs reducing profit margins may raise barriers to the entrance of new players and favor a monopoly or duopoly situation (a case of high fixed costs and low marginal ones is presented in Naldi and D'Acquisto [2008] ). In this duopoly case, the best response functions (11) become
Again, we can solve this system of nonlinear equations numerically, finding the Nash equilibrium as the intersection (if any) between the best responses, as in Figure 1 (left) . The best-response functions for the duopoly are shown when the providers have equal intrinsic quality and have the same shape in all the other cases we have examined. Though the curves cross in two points, the solution leading to a 1 = a 2 = 1 is to be discarded since, as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, there is no real best response for CP i when the opponent j = i sets a j = 1, with the strategy a i = 1 being dominated, and strictly dominated if a j < 1.
In Figure 1 (right), we see how the Nash equilibrium point moves as the differences in quality between the two providers change. A content provider with higher intrinsic Fig. 1 . Best response functions in the symmetric duopoly case (left) and locus of Nash equilibrium points in a duopoly, both under neutral behavior. quality can increase its advertising load. In the symmetric case (Q 1 = Q 2 ), we obtain the Nash equilibrium point a 1 = a 2 = 2/3 from Eq. (15) with n = 2.
3.1.3. Numerical Study. We now go back to the general asymmetric case of n content providers and assess the presence and characteristics of a Nash equilibrium in typical scenarios. For this purpose, we consider two types of repartition of the intrinsic quality among CPs: linear and geometric. Without loss of generality, we sort the CPs in decreasing order of quality: CP 1 exhibits the largest intrinsic quality, and CP n has the lowest. We can define the quality of the generic i-th content provider as a function of the two bounds Q 1 and Q n . In the linear model, the intrinsic quality of the i-th content provider is
In the geometric model, we have instead
Note that we consider here that the share of benefits taken by the search engine is the same for all CPs, namely, b i = b for all i ∈ I. We report here the case of 5 content providers, with Q 1 = 0.9 and Q 5 = 0.1. We use the solution (11) to see how the intrinsic quality influences the optimal amount of advertisement. Both in the linear and geometric case, we find a single Nash equilibrium. The relation between the intrinsic quality and the amount of advertising a i is shown in Figure 2 : content providers with larger intrinsic quality give more advertising, though the sensitivity is quite small (i.e., a ninefold increase in the intrinsic quality when the advertising factor increases by just 17.58% in the linear model and by 21.94% in the geometric one).
Utility (and therefore the revenue of the CP) is also affected by the intrinsic quality, as shown in Figure 2 (right). Although both trends are approximately linear, the more uneven repartition of qualities in the geometric case leads to wider imbalances in the repartition of utilities. While the ratio Q max /Q min of extreme intrinsic qualities is 9 in both cases, the range of utility U max − U min is larger for the geometric repartition (though the high-to-low ratio for utility is 8.63 for the linear case and just 8.41 for the geometric one). After examining the impact of the intrinsic quality on the individual strategic decisions, we now consider the impact on the quality perceived by users. For CP i, the introduction of advertisement lowers its quality from the intrinsic value Q i to the QoE V i = Q i (1 − a i ). In the previous example, we considered a wide range for intrinsic quality values to examine whether the introduction of advertisement (the leverage through which content providers seek their maximal profits) magnifies these differences in quality or levels them out.
In order to assess this impact, we employ the Herfindahl-Hirschman index that measures the concentration of a market among a number of competitors (i.e., the level of competition) and is the most sensitive among such indicators [Naldi 2003 ]. Given a set of market shares {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n } that satisfy the constraint i∈I m i = 1, the HHI is HHI = i∈I m 2 i (18) and lies in the interval [0, 1] . Higher values of the HHI indicate a larger degree of concentration (hence a lower level of competition). Here we do not have the market shares (expressed as fractions of the overall revenues), but consider utility values as their proxy. In fact, utilities are proportional to revenues, the proportionality constant being equal for all competitors. After normalizing the utility values to their sum, we get figures equal to the market shares. In order to distinguish the HHI computed by using utilities from that computed using the market shares (though they lead to the same numerical result), we use the definition
In addition to measuring the concentration of the market, we can use the HHI to measure the attraction power due to quality. Though used typically for market shares, the HHI is basically a concentration metric, not unlike the classical Gini index (used, e.g., to measure the distribution of wealth). For example, the HHI has been used to measure the distribution of patents [Pilkington and Liston-Heyes 2004] . We can draw a similarity between market shares and quality values. Let's consider two cases at either end of a market structure: quasi monopoly and perfect competition. In a quasi monopoly, a single company has nearly 100% of the market and its competitors have negligible market shares. The analogous case for quality is where a SE has a quality much higher than the other SEs. Instead, in a perfect competition, the market is divided equally among all the companies. The analogous case for quality is where the SEs all have the same quality. In this context, the HHI can be used to measure the degree of concentration of quality among the content providers. If we replace the market shares in the definition (18) with quality values, we obtain two quality-based HHIs employing, respectively, the intrinsic and the perceived quality.
Larger values of HHI Q mean higher imbalances in quality. By comparing HHI Q (no advertising) with HHI V (including advertising), we can assess the effect of advertising choices of all content providers on quality distribution. We report the results in Table I . Under both the linear and the geometric model, the HHI index is larger for the intrinsic quality than for the QoE. In other words, the introduction of advertisement brings along a slight leveling of the quality perceived by the user. In Table I , we also report the HHI (denoted by HHI U ) pertaining to market concentration. We see that the concentration is somewhat intermediate between that of the intrinsic quality and that of the perceived; the repartition of utility is less affected by the introduction of advertisement than the quality perceived by users.
Nonneutral Behavior: Revenue-Based Ranking
When the ranking is only based on the potential revenue for the SE and scores are taken from (3), with the position X i := b i Q i , the utility of the content provider is given by
The following proposition shows that nonneutral behavior incentivizes CPs to increase their advertising level with respect to the neutral case. This incentive is indeed twofold, since a larger a i yields more revenue per click, but also attracts more clicks because of the nonneutral ranking (where s i increases with a i ). PROOF. We simply see that the revenue R i of a CP i ∈ I is strictly increasing in a i in that it is indeed null for a i = 0, and for a i > 0 in that it is strictly positive with
We immediately remark that, in this case, the resulting QoE is V i = 0 for each CP i. The revenue of each CP i ∈ I becomes R i = β Note that, when β varies (increases) with the average QoE for users, this revenue can be much smaller than initially expected by the CPs, that is, as price takers made their strategic choices considering β a constant. For example, if, as in Section 4, we take β proportional to the expected user QoE, then the final outcome is a situation where users prefer not to use the search engine (since β = 0) and the CPs make no revenue.
Nonneutral Behavior: Weighted-QoE Ranking
We investigate here the situation where the ranking scores are taken from (4), that is, the search engine considers the QoE as in the neutral case, but introduces some weights among them so as to favor those CPs in which it has the most interest.
The resulting proportion of clicks per search on CP i is then
Accordingly, the utility of the content provider is given by the difference between what it receives through advertising and what it passes to the search engine:
Again, each content provider seeks to maximize its revenue by setting the quantity of advertising. The analysis follows the one carried out in Section 3.1, where, for each CP i, the parameter Q i is replaced by b i Q i , In particular, the best response function of CP i is then
We then have the counterpart of Proposition 3.1.
PROPOSITION 3.4. When the search engine performs a weighted-QoE ranking with weights (b i ) i∈I , the noncooperative game played by price-taking CPs fixing their advertising level has at least one Nash equilibrium a NE ∈ (0, 1) |I| . More precisely, there exists a Nash equilibrium and any Nash equilibrium is such that
Note that the symmetric case wherein the n content providers have the same intrinsic quality and transfer to the search engine the same share of their utility (i.e., Q i = Q, b i = b) gives the exact same case as the one analyzed in Section 3.1.1 for the neutral ranking.
3.3.1. Numerical Study. We now examine the asymmetric case, numerically solving the game. We use the case of Section 3.1.3 with five content providers, one owned by the search engine (it transfers all its utility to it) and wherein all the others pay the same share b i = 0.1. Their intrinsic quality follows either a linear or a geometric trend, with the content provider owned by the search engine exhibiting either the highest intrinsic quality (Scenario A) or the lowest (Scenario B), as reported in Table II , that is, the two extreme cases. The two most important questions here concern the impact of vertical integration on the CP's results. If the CP has the worst intrinsic quality, how much gain from being the search engine's favorite one? And if the CP is instead already the best in the group, does it gain or lose from being owned by the SE? In this section, we examine the advertising choices made by the content providers and their impact on utility.
We report the results of the game, namely the resulting advertising factor a i , in Figure 3 for the two scenarios. In both cases, the content providers not owned by the search engine use an advertising factor that increases slightly with the intrinsic quality through a roughly linear trend. We expect that, in the absence of vertical integration, the CP would follow the trend depicted for the other CPs. Instead, we see that with vertical integration the behavior of the vertically integrated CP differs markedly; from that trend the content provider owned by the search engine substantially increases its advertising load, especially when its intrinsic quality is large. We can see that the boost is much higher in Scenario A (wherein the vertically integrated content provider has an intrinsic quality of 0.9) than in Scenario B (wherein this intrinsic quality is just 0.1). For example, let's consider the linear case in Figure 3(a) with Scenario A, with the behavior of the CPs represented by black dots. We see there is a linear trend: the advertising factor is expected to grow linearly with the intrinsic quality. On this basis, we would expect the vertically integrated CP, whose intrinsic quality is 0.9 (as shown in Table II) , to follow this linear trend (if it were not vertically integrated) and end up with an advertising factor around 0.55. Instead, we see its black dot in the upper-right corner just below 0.8, meaning that the vertically integrated CP is led to put much more advertising in its content due to vertical integration. The same can be said for Scenario B, wherein the vertically integrated CP is instead that with the lowest intrinsic quality.
If we consider the net utility (that remaining after transferring a share to the search engine), the vertically integrated content provider has, of course, zero utility. But we get a better view of the competition between content providers by considering the gross utility (that obtained prior to paying the tax to the search engine) defined after Eq. (19).
In Figure 3 (right), we see that, for all providers except that owned by the search engine, the utility grows roughly linearly with the intrinsic quality, although at a faster rate in the geometric case. The utility of the content provider owned by the search engine is instead boosted by the larger cash flow it transfers to the search engine, which in turn raises its score in the nonneutral case. The boost is again larger in Scenario A, that is, when the vertically integrated content provider has the largest intrinsic quality. However, even in Scenario B the boost is sufficient to bring the vertically integrated Fig. 3 . Impact of the intrinsic quality on the advertising factor (left) and gross utility (right), with pricetaking CPs, weighted-QoE ranking. Table III . The comparison between HHI Q and HHI V (before and after introducing advertisements) tells us that the introduction of advertisement levels the quality perceived by users, since HHI V < HHI Q . Instead, the market concentration is altered depending on which content provider is owned by the search engine. If the search engine owns the content provider with the highest intrinsic quality (Scenario A), this further boosts its score and utility, leading to quite a stronger concentration. In other words, HHIÛ is more than twice as large as HHI Q . When the search engine owns the content provider with the lowest intrinsic quality (Scenario B), the utility of the latter is likewise pushed up, but this leads to a more balanced repartition and a diminishing HHI.
EQUILIBRIUM ADVERTISING STRATEGIES OF PRICE-SETTING CONTENT PROVIDERS
After examining the situation of a quasi-monopolistic search engine market in Section 3, in this section we consider that users may select a different search engine. We define a game model and find the best response functions for the cases of neutral and nonneutral behavior, examining the resulting advertising strategies in some scenarios.
The propensity of a user to employ the search engine under consideration is still represented by β, assumed here as proportional to the average QoE of content providers accessed through this search engine (the expected user's QoE when clicking on a link, 10:16 P. Coucheney et al. C i , being the probability that the user ends up visiting CP i):
We recall the general expression (6) for CP i's revenues
where C i = s i / j∈I s j , and s i is the score credited to CP i by the SE.
Neutral Behavior
As in Section 3.1, the neutral ranking is based on V i , hence the proportion of clicks on CP i is
By neglecting the revenue transfer to the search engine in the general expression (20) for the revenues, we can use the utility U i = β C i a i .
Under this ranking behavior, the revenue of the i-th content providers is proportional to 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ). However, since
By expanding this equation, we obtain the following simplified form of the optimization equation for CP i as
If we now replace the full expression for X and Y and rearrange terms, we obtain a fourth-degree polynomial equation in the QoE
By collecting the n similar expressions for the best response functions of all the content providers, we end up with a system of n polynomial equations that must be solved to find Nash equilibria. The system of equations can be numerically solved.
We can consider the special symmetric case by setting Q i = Q, b i = b, and a i = a in the general Eq. (21), since nothing else depends on the specific content provider.
The first-order optimality condition is then
Nonneutral Behavior: Revenue-Based Ranking
In the preceding case, the utility function of the search engine becomes
From the utility maximization condition, we get
leading to the following optimization equation whose solution should provide the best response function for the i-th content provider
and giving the following third-degree polynomial equation in a i :
Instead of the numerical approach required in the general case, we can find a simple form of the best-response function in the symmetric case. If all the content providers transfer the same percentage of their utility to the search engine and exhibit the same intrinsic quality, we expect their best-response function to be the same. After setting b i = b, Q i = Q, and a i = a, and some manipulation, we obtain the symmetric equilibrium advertising level
When the number of providers grows, the relative amount of advertising tends towards the saturation value 1. If we insert the solution (24) into the general expression of utility (23), we get the utility for the symmetric case as
Nonneutral Behavior: Weighted-QoE Ranking
With the scores taken from (4), the utility function of CP i becomes
If we set (for the sake of simplicity) X = j∈I b j Q 2 j (1−a j ) 2 and Y = j∈I b j Q j (1−a j ), the optimization equation can be written as a fourth-degree polynomial equation in a i If we consider the symmetric case, we have X = nbQ 2 (1 − a) 2 and Y = nbQ(1 − a), which, when replaced in (25), give the symmetric equilibrium advertising factor
that tends to the limit a = 1/2 when the number of providers grows. In the symmetric case, the utility of each CP is therefore
Neutral vs. Nonneutral Ranking
We now compare the ranking strategies when the CPs have identical intrinsic qualities. We plot in Figure 4 the equilibrium advertising levels in the symmetric case versus the number of content providers. We call the equilibria in (24) and (26), respectively, as revenue-based and weighted-QoE scoring. Both functions grow with the number of providers, but achieve different values. When the behavior of the SE is purely greedy, the advertising factor starts at 0.75 with two CPs and tends to 1 when the number of CPs grows (under tough competition, the QoE gets very close to zero). Instead, if the scoring function includes the QoE, the optimal advertising factor starting at 0.4 under duopoly grows, but is upper-bounded by the value 0.5. In other words, users will get a QoE never lower than in the neutral case (i.e., half the intrinsic quality value). In the same figure we also plot the gross utility of each CP. A neutral ranking favors CPs, unless the number of competing CPs becomes large (above 20 when b = 0.1). In this case, the weighted-QoE-based ranking would yield a larger utility to CPs. We now assess the impact of the ranking policy in a nonsymmetric setting, with a linear repartition of quality (17), when the number of CPs changes (the geometric distribution yields similar results). We consider two scenarios, that is, the CP owned by the SE is that with the highest (Figure 5 ) or the lowest intrinsic quality (Figure 6 ). We iteratively solve the game. In order to evaluate the impact on users, we define user welfare (or, with a slight abuse of vocabulary, the revenue of users) as being equal to β, namely the propensity of users to employ the search engine. We examine the revenue of the SE (including that of its CP), the gross revenue (the aggregated revenue of all CPs but the owned one prior to paying the SE, the revenue of the SE, hence including the integrated CP revenue), and the global revenue, namely the sum of both. Notice that, even in the neutral scenario, the equilibrium depends on the CP vertically integrated with the SE, since their revenue is shared between both entities. When the smallest CP is integrated with the SE, we observe in Figure 6 that all revenues decrease with the number of CPs. In addition, when there are more than three CPs, the ranking policies are Pareto ordered; the revenue-based ranking is worst for every stakeholder and the neutral one is always preferred. This suggests there is no need to enforce search neutrality, in other words, even for the search engine it is preferable to implement a neutral ranking.
In the case of the biggest CP integrated, we see in Figure 5 that the comparison is not as clear. The revenues are decreasing with respect to the number of players for every stakeholder, except the gross revenue that initially increases. As the number of CPs grows, they get a ever-greater proportion of the global revenue at the expense of the SE. The weighted-QoE-based ranking provides larger revenues both for the SE and overall, probably because owning the highest-quality CP (rather than the lowestquality one) gives the SE a stronger position in the game soas to adopt a nonneutral ranking. Also, users get a larger welfare for any ranking policy compared to Figure 6 and prefer weighted-QoE-based ranking. Since the user's welfare corresponds to the propensity of using the SE, the average relevance is better with the nonneutral ranking. This observation, though not intuitive, shows that the use of nonneutral ranking may result in a Nash equilibrium where less advertisement is set compared to the neutral equilibrium. However, this holds here because the SE owns the most relevant CP and therefore should not be taken as a valid argument against neutrality. Indeed, one of the objectives of search neutrality is to enable innovation by making (relevant) new entrants reachable through the SE. In our case a weighted-QoE-based ranking goes against this objective, since the average perceived relevance is lower than in the neutral case in Figure 6 (when the best CPs are not owned by the SE). When there is no vertical integration but the CPs do not offer the same intrinsic quality, the results we obtain are very close to the case wherein the worst CP is vertically integrated to the SE; in the integration effects are boosted by the intrinsic quality of the CP.
Finally, note that in both scenarios the revenue of the nonintegrated CPs is larger with a neutral ranking, which suggests enforcing neutrality. Indeed, even if a nonneutral stance increases the user's QoE when the SE integrates quality content, it harms the other CPs' revenue, possibly preventing them from innovating and improving their quality.
CONCLUSIONS
This article provides a mathematical model for the analysis of different ranking policies in search engines within a context when content providers have to compete for users and get revenue through advertising. Depending on the ranking adopted, content providers can choose their advertising level, balancing larger advertising revenues against lower quality-of-experience and less users. We have analyzed the noncooperative game played among content providers in different settings and studied the corresponding equilibria.
Our results indicate that the neutral ranking provides users with the largest perceived quality-of-experience, which is not surprising. But we also observe that such a ranking policy can be preferred as well by a search engine willing to maximize revenue, a less intuitive outcome. This is true if the search engine does not control the best-performing content providers. However, if the search engine integrates quality content, then it can increase its revenue by switching to a nonneutral ranking; this may even benefit users who will perceive a better quality-of-experience, but would be
